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against property damage loss-as is, in effect, required by Fla.
Stat. § 627.733, F.S.A., with respect to other possible damages-
the issues would be different. A reasonable alternative to an
action in tort would have been provided .... 8
The remaining portion of Florida's no-fault insurance law still may have
to withstand the equal protection of law and trial by jury arguments, but
similar laws in other jurisdictions have withstood these arguments. 9
Nineteen states have now adopted no-fault insurance programs in
one form or another, and the question of whether no-fault plans should
be adopted is pending in many state legislatures.4" The Kluger decision
is an indication that in spite of the recognized virtues of no-fault in-
surance, the courts will not allow traditional constitutional guarantees
to be abrogated. States which are now in the process of enacting no-fault
laws should consider the guidelines established by Kluger in drafting
their no-fault legislation to help avoid nullification by the courts.
BRUCE S. GOLDSTEIN
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE: JUSTICE IN FLORIDA FOR
THE CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT PLAINTIFF
Following the death of her husband in a truck-car collision, plain-
tiff brought actions for wrongful death alleging that defendant Phillip
F. Hoffman had been negligent in operating a truck owned by a defen-
dant Pay-A-Way Corporation.1 The defendants' answers pleaded gen-
eral denials and the defense of contributory negligence. The plaintiff's
request for jury instructions based upon comparative negligence was
denied by the trial judge and a jury verdict in favor of the defendants
resulted. The plaintiff appealed to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, which, in an unprecedented decision, reversed the judgment
of the trial court and ordered a new trial in accordance with its opinion
rejecting the rule of contributory negligence and adopting the principle
of comparative negligence.2 The Supreme Court of Florida on conflict
38. 281 So. 2d at 5.
39. Pinnick v. Cleary, - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of Massachusetts' no-fault insurance law); contra, Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d
478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (striking down Illinois' no-fault insurance law as unconstitu-
tional).
40. Busnmss WEEK, June 9, 1973, at 33.
1. Jones v. Hoffman, 272 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). The plaintiff maintained one
action in her individual capacity as widow, and the second as administratrix of the dece-
dent's estate.
2. Id. The holding of the district court was unprecedented in that it attempted to over-
rule precedent established by the Supreme Court of Florida 87 years earlier in Louisville
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certiorari reveiw, held, affirmed: In a negligence action, a contributorily
negligent plaintiff is no longer absolutely barred from recovery, and may
now recover, under the comparative negligence rule, that amount of
damages which the jury finds to have been proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence minus the amount the jury finds to be proxi-
mately caused by the plaintiff's negligence. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d
431 (Fla. 1973).
Prior to the Hoffman case, a contributorily negligent plaintiff in Flor-
ida was denied any recovery.8 Florida's courts had defined contributory
negligence as conduct by the plaintiff which contributes as a legal cause
to his injuries and which falls below the standard of care that he is
required to observe for his own protection.4 The rationale for the rule
stemmed from the assumption that a court of law was incapable of
apportioning the damages which arose from injuries caused by the
mutual and contemporaneously concurring negligence of the plaintiff
and defendant
The Supreme Court of Florida, in scrapping this doctrine for one
of comparative negligence, specifically rejected the contention that con-
tributory negligence had been adopted in Florida by the legislature and
could only be altered by that body. It reached this decision by reasoning
that contributory negligence was a judicial creation which had been
specifically adopted by the court in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Yniestra,0 and not by the legislature in enacting section 2.01 of the
Florida Statutes, which declared in force the common and statutory law
of England that was of a general nature as of July 4, 1776.' The majority's
conclusion, which Justice Roberts vigorously disputed in his solitary
dissent,8 was grounded upon its belief that the first clear cut pronounce-
& N.R.R. v. Vniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886), in which the supreme court adopted the rule of
contributory negligence. The district court recognized the importance of the issue it had de-
cided and certified it to the supreme court as one involving a question of great public inter-
est. However, mere certification by the district court could not vest the supreme court with
jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari by one of the parties was needed in addition to the
certification by the district court. FLA. Co NsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3). For this, the district court
was treated to a severe reprimand by the supreme court, which admonished the district
court by drawing its attention to the uncertainty and confusion its premature decision had
created in the minds of attorneys and trial and appellate judges. It concluded its reprimand
by holding that, in the event of a conflict between a decision of a district court of appeal
and the supreme court, the latter's decision would prevail until overruled by a subsequent
supreme court decision. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 433-34 (Fla. 1973).
3. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886) [hereinafter referred to as
Yniestra].
4. Shayne v. Saunders, 128 Fla. 891, 176 So. 495 (1937).
5. Winner v. Sharp, 43 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1949); Wachula Mfg. & Timber Co. v. Jackson,
70 Fla. 596, 70 So. 599 (1916).
6. 280 So. 2d at 434, citing Louisville & N.R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886).
7. 280 So. 2d at 434-35 construing FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1971). This statute's predecessor
was first enacted by the legislature in 1829, Act of Nov. 6, 1829, § 1, which was 67 years
prior to the Yniestra decision.
8. 280 So. 2d at 440-41 (dissenting opinion). Justice Roberts asserted that in Florida
the rule had been legislatively adopted in section 2.01 of the Florida Statutes, and that the
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ment of the rule as a complete bar to recovery by the English courts
did not come until at least 33 years after the operative statutory date
of July 4, 1776.9 It then made the observation that it was under no
obligation to adhere to a common law doctrine which was not "plain"
as of that date.10
However, the court did not rest here. It reasoned that even if the
contributory negligence rule is an element of our common law because of
prior judicial decision, it can be modified whenever social conditions so
demand. It buttressed this argument by surveying generally its exercise
of this power to modify common law doctrines," and by specifically
noting the changes it had wrought upon the harshness of the rule of
contributory negligence by adopting such ameliorating doctrines as
"appreciable degree," "last clear chance," "gross, willful and wanton neg-
ligence," and "strict liability." 2
Having decided it possessed the power to both reexamine and alter
its position in Yniestra' 3 if it chose to do so,' 4 the court embarked upon
majority was violating the separation of powers doctrine in concluding that the court
possessed the power to alter it. He based his reasoning on the premise that contributory
negligence had become a part of the common law in Bayly v. Merrell, 79 Eng. Rep. 331
(K.B. 1606), decided 170 years before the statute's operative date of 1776. The language in
Bayly upon which Justice Roberts relied, "and being his own negligence, he is without
remedy," does not support his assertion. It should be realized that this language is dictum
and that the action in Bayly was for fraud and deceit, not personal injuries. The language
was labeled misleading by the majority since it originally referred to a negligent act by 'the
plaintiff which was the effective direct cause of his injurious accident, and not to the lack
of due care by a plaintiff which contributes to his injuries. 280 So. 2d at 434, citing Turk,
Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189, 196 (1950).
9. 280 So. 2d at 434, citing Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809)
[hereinafter cited as Butterfield]; Raisin v. Mitchell, 173 Eng. Rep. 979 (C.P. 1839) [here-
inafter cited as Raisin]. The majority was on firm ground in stating that most scholars at-
tribute the origin of the rule as we know it today to Butterfield. Maloney, From Contributory
to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135, 141-42 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Maloney]; W. PROSSER, LAW Or ToaTs § 65, at 416 (4th ed. 1971).
However, the majority is in error in citing Raisin as standing for the principle that con-
tributory negligence was not a complete bar to recovery 30 years after Butterfield. The jury
in Raisin disregarded its instructions "to find for the defendant if they found that the
plaintiff's injuries were caused in any degree by his lack of care," and awarded the plain-
tiff half of the admitted damages. This jury can be considered to have been among the first
of its kind to ameliorate the rule's harshness by ignoring its instructions. See Maloney, su-
pra, at 151-52.
10. 280 So. 2d at 435.
11. 280 So. 2d at 435-36. The court had modified doctrines which previously had: given
a father superior custody rights to a child, Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, 1 So. 2d
480 (1941); allowed a tortfeasor's liability for personal injuries to be abated upon his
death, Waller v. First Say. & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931); and prohibited
a wife from recovering for the loss of consortium resulting from her husband's injuries,
Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971).
12. 280 So. 2d at 435. It also noted that these "refinements" had necessarily effectuated
a judicial transformation of any "statutory creation" the rule might possibly have enjoyed.
13. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1:886).
14. 280 So. 2d at 436. The court did not exclude the appropriateness of legislative ac-
tion, but reasoned it would be abdicating its own function in a peculiarly nonstatutory field
If it declined to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule. Id. at 435-36, citing
Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971).
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a critical evaluation of the compatibility of contributory negligence with
today's conceptions of "equity" and "justice." It first observed that there
was not only any contemporary justification for a rule which places the
entire burden of accidental loss on a slightly negligent plaintiff. 5 It
reasoned that if fault were to remain the test of liability, then com-
parative negligence represented a more equitable system of determining
liability and a more socially desirable method of loss distribution. 6
The doctrine of comparative negligence allocates damages based
upon the proportion of each party's negligence. Each pays that part of the
total damages he has legally caused the other, and is only barred from
recovering those damages which he inflicted upon himself. The court
reasoned that this system is more desirable than one which could place
the entire burden of loss on only one of two legally responsible parties."1
The court also observed that there was little or no merit in the
argument that juries tend to ameliorate the theoretical harshness of the
rule in ignoring their instructions. It reasoned that there has to be some-
thing basically wrong with a rule of law which causes a layman to breach
his solemn oath to follow the judge's instructions. It decided that this
rule's perpetuation could only engender further hypocrisy and disrespect
for the law on the part of the lay community."8
The court, on the basis of this reevaluation, concluded that it would
shirk its duty if it did not adopt the comparative negligence rule and there-
fore affirmed the district court by holding that "a plaintiff in an action
based on negligence will no longer be denied any recovery because of his
This reasoning by the Hoffman court certainly does not square with that of its prede-
cessors in either Yniestra or Co-Operative Sanitary Baking Co. v. Shields, 71 Fla. 110, 70
So. 934 (1916). It is entirely possible that the Hoffman court adopted this position after
it realized there was little or no chance for the legislative enactment of comparative negli-
gence. The court itself in Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175
So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965), had impeded the legislature's efforts by declaring the 1887 compara-
tive negligence railroad accident statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it was of lim-
ited and not general application. It had also witnessed the sustaining of a gubernatorial
veto of a comparative negligence statute of general application passed by the 1943 legisla-
ture, 280 So. 2d at 437-38, and it had most likely discerned the great influence the insurance
lobby could exert upon legislators. See Maloney, supra note 9, at 161. The Hoffman ma-jority noted that there had been little legislative effort in this area since the 1943 veto, and
that this could have meant that the legislature considered the adoption of comparative neg-
ligence to be a judicial problem. 280 So. 2d at 438.
15. 280 So. 2d at 436. It found that the historical justification of "protecting the essen-
tial growth of industries, particularly transportation," was no longer valid and that modern
society favored the individual, not industry. Id. at 436-37.
16. Id. at 436.
17. Id. at 437. The court was utilizing the principles attributable to the pure form of
comparative negligence. See id. at 438; Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463, 473 (1970).
18. 280 So. 2d at 437, citing Maloney, supra note 9, at 151-52. Juries' dissatisfaction
with contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery has been evidenced by their re-jection of the former rule and unauthorized application of the principles of comparative
negligence. Comment, Dilemma of the Florida Defendant in a Personal Injury Suit, 6
MiAmi L.Q. 106, 108 (1951), Gilliam, Comparative Negligence Under Earlier Arkansas Stat-
utes, 10 ARK. L. Rav. 65, 65-6 (1956); Comment, The National Traffic and Motor Safety
Act: Must the Reasonable Man be Concerned, 19 U. FrA. L. REV. 635, 649 (1967).
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contributory negligence."19 It expressly exempted from the operation of
this rule defendants who could not have prevented injuring the plaintiff
by exercising due care or whose negligence was not a direct legal cause of
the plaintiff's injuries. It also denied its availability to plaintiffs whose
negligence by itself, or in concurrence with that of a third person other
than the defendant, is the sole legal cause of their injuries. The court also
noted that the plaintiff's doctrine of "last clear chance" will have no ap-
plication in ensuing litigation.20
While the majority did affirm the decision of the fourth district, it
expanded the latter's decision in two major areas. First, the court adopted
the pure form of comparative negligence, which permits a jury to award
a 99 percent legally responsible plaintiff the damages caused to him by
a defendant who was only one percent legally responsible. 1 The purpose
of the pure form is:
(1) To allow a jury to apportion fault as it sees fit
between negligent parties whose negligence was part of the
legal and proximate cause of any loss or injury: and
(2) To apportion the total damages resulting from the
loss or injury according to the proportionate fault of each
party.22
Thus, if both the plaintiff's and defendant's negligence were to some
degree a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the jury in assessing dam-
ages should only award the plaintiff such damages as were attributable
to the defendant's negligence.
[T] he jury should apportion the negligence of the plaintiff
and the negligence of the defendant; then, in reaching the
amount due the plaintiff, the jury should give the plaintiff only
such an amount proportioned with his negligence and the negli-
gence of the defendant.23
19. 280 So. 2d at 438.
20. Id.
21. Id. The obtaining of this result would depend on whether or not the defendant
counterclaimed. Id. at 439. Florida is the fifth state to adopt the pure form of comparative
negligence, but is the first to do so by a judicial abrogation of the common law. Mississippi,
Washington, Rhode Island, and Arkansas have adopted the pure form by statute. It should
be noted that Arkansas followed the pure form for only two years (1955-57). In 1957, the
Arkansas legislature substituted the modified form for the pure form. Washington enacted
a pure form statute in 1973, but it did not become operative until April 1, 1974. Fisher &
Wax, Comparative Negligence-Some Unanswered Questions, 47 FLA. B.J. 566, 567 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Fisher]. There are two other generally recognized forms of compara-
tive negligence. These are the modified and slight versus gross negligence forms. Both are
generally adopted by statute. The modified form allows the apportionment of damages
based on the proportioned negligence of each party only if the plaintiff's negligence is not
4'greater than" the defendant's. The slight negligence of the plaintiff versus the gross negli-
gence of the defendant approach allows an apportionment only if the plaintiff's negligence
was slight in relation to the defendant's. Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463, 474-78 (1970). For a
general discussion of the various forms of comparative negligence see 57 Am. JUR. 2d Neg-
ligence §§ 426-55 (1971); 65A C.J.S. Negligence §§ 169-73 (1966).
22. 280 So. 2d at 439 (emphasis added).
23. 280 So. 2d at 438.
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A jury which finds the negligence of the defendant to be 40 per-
cent and that of the plaintiff to be 60 percent and also finds the latter
to have suffered $10,000 in damages, should award the plaintiff $4,000.
The jury would arrive at this amount by first multiplying the percentage
it finds the plaintiff's proportionate negligence to be (60 percent) times
the amount of damages it finds he has suffered ($10,000). It would then
subtract the resulting figure ($6,000), which equals the amount of
damages that the plaintiff caused himself, from his total damages
($10,000). The remainder ($4,000) represents the dollar amount of
damages that the 40 percent negligent defendant legally caused the 60
percent negligent plaintiff. The same procedure would be followed if the
defendant counterclaimed and the jury found his damages to be $10,000.
The jury, by using this formula would find that the defendant was legally
responsible for $4,000 of his own damages and would award him $6,000.
The jury would then return two verdicts. One of $4,000 for the plaintiff,
and a second verdict for the defendant-counterclaimant of $6,000. The
trial judge, by utilizing the contract litigation principle of "set off," would
subtract the smaller verdict from the larger and enter one judgment for the
remainder ($2,000). This judgment would be in favor of the party who
had received the larger verdict. Hence, in such a case, the plaintiff would
receive nothing.24
The second area of expansion by the Hoffman court was in granting
trial judges the discretionary power to require juries to return special
verdicts. 5 In Florida, prior to Hoffman, special verdicts were discre-
tionary with the jury except in cases involving the determination of
punitive damages against joint tortfeasors, 6 and possibly in declaratory
24. 280 So. 2d at 438-39. The defendant's counterclaim referred to in this example and
by the court is of a compulsory nature. Compulsory counterclaims are governed by FLA. R.
Cxv. P. 1.170(a). It would be to the defendant's benefit to counterclaim against the plain-
tiff, since any verdict returned for the plaintiff would be diminished by both the jury's ap-
portionment of negligence and by the amount of the counterclaim verdict. Of course, it is
also possible, as in the example, that the defendant's counterclaim verdict may exceed that
of the plaintiff's. 280 So. 2d at 439.
25. 280 So. 2d at 439. Florida is the first state to judicially authorize the use of special
verdicts in applying the pure form. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463, 473 (1970); Ghiardi &
Hogan, Comparative Negligence-The Wisconsin Rule, 18 DF. L.J. 537, 547 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Ghiardi].
26. Spencer Ladd's Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as Spencer Ladd's], rev'd in part and aff'd in part, Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's Inc.,
182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Lehman]. The District Court of Appeal,
First District, in Spencer Ladd's relied on precedent and held that a jury could ignore a
trial judge's request for a special verdict and simply return a general verdict. Lincoln Tower
Corp. v. Dunhall's-Florida, Inc., 61 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1952); Florida E.C. Ry. v. Lassiter,
58 Fla. 234, 50 So. 428 (1909). The supreme court in Lehman abrogated its prior holdings
in Lincoln and Lassiter only to the extent of granting trial judges, in cases where punitive
damages against joint tortfeasors are in issue, the power to require the jury to return a
special verdict in assessing the punitive damages against each tortfeasor. The court refused
to extend its holding beyond this point and consequently held that it was still within a
jury's discretion to refuse to return a special verdict in the determination of compensatory
damages.
CASES NOTED
judgment actions where the nature of the triable issues were in common
law and not in equity.27 When viewed with the court's examples of the
jury's role in the practical application of the pure form role,28 this special
verdict provision raises the question of whether or not the court intended
the term "special verdicts" to be construed and utilized in accord with
their common law usage in Florida.29 The better view is that it did not,
as the use of this type of verdict by trial courts would deprive the jury
of the very duties attributed to it by the Hoffman court. In returning a
common law special verdict, a jury acts only as a fact finder. It makes
specific and separate findings on each issue of fact submitted to it by
the trial court, leaving to the court the application of the relevant prin-
ciples of law to the special verdict findings. It is patently clear from
the examples in the opinion that the Hoffman court intended for juries
to discharge these dual duties. 1
Having found it unlikely that the supreme court intended for com-
mon law special verdicts to be used in the implementation of the pure
form rule, it is necessary to determine the type of verdict which can be
utilized by the trial courts. It is possible to interpret the opinion as allow-
ing trial judges to choose among three additional types of verdicts: the
general verdict, statutory special verdict, and general verdict with written
interrogatories. This conclusion is well justified for three reasons. First,
the Hoffman court authorized, but did not require, the use of special ver-
dicts;32 second, broad discretionary power was granted to trial judges
for the purpose of accomplishing the objectives expressed in the opinion;
and third, the supreme court stated its belief that possible problems
should be solved by the trial courts in a practical manner, rather than
theoretically by the appellate courts. 8
A trial court could utilize the general verdict. However, its use
should be discouraged, since a trial court would have no way of ascer-
taining whether or not the jury had applied the principles of the pure
form of comparative negligence. The trial court would also be unable
to determine how the jury had decided upon the amount of damages it
returned in its verdict, or if it had disregarded or misunderstood the
27. See FLA. STAT. § 86.071 (1971), relating to jury trials in declaratory judgment ac-
tions.
28. 280 So. 2d at 438-39.
29. See 32 FLA. JuR. Trial §§ 246, 269 (1960).
30. 32 FLA. JuR. Trial §§ 246, 269 (1960); Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 438, 440 (1966); 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDUnRE, § 2503, at 488 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Wright]; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mica. L. REV. 465, 499-500 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Prosser]. It is clear from the progressive tone of the opinion that the
supreme court could not have intended to burden the trial courts with the onerous prob-
lems that attend the usage of the common law special verdict, such as the requirement that
every controverted issue of material fact be submitted to the jury for a special verdict find-
ing. See Wright, supra, § 2501, at 484.
31. 280 So. 2d at 438-39.
32. Id. at 439.
33. Id. at 440.
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court's comparative negligence instructions.14 Hence, an overly sym-
pathetic jury could assess the plaintiff's entire damages against the defen-
dant without actually apportioning the negligence of the parties.3 5 This
has been a criticism leveled at Mississippi's pure form statute under
which only the general verdict is utilized.8
A second form of verdict which could be utilized is the statutory
special verdict. Variations of this type of special verdict are employed
under Wisconsin's modified form comparative negligence statute 7 and
codified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a).8 Submission of
special verdicts by Wisconsin trial courts is discretionary, unless their
use is requested by either of the parties.89
The Wisconsin special verdicts require the jury to determine: (1) the
percentage of the defendant's negligence, (2) the percentage of the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence, (3) causation, and (4) damages suffered.
The jury returns its answers supposedly without knowing what effect they
will have. It is then the duty of the court to diminish the plaintiff's
damages in proportion to his percentage of negligence and award a general
verdict.4 0 It should be noted that these special verdicts may contain
mixed questions of fact and law; therefore, legal conclusions by the jury
are proper.4
The federal special verdict does not differ appreciably in its opera-
tion from its Wisconsin counterpart. Under the federal rule; the use of
special verdicts is wholly within the court's discretion. 2
34. Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 547; Leflar, Comparative Negligence: A Summary for
Arkansas Lawyers, 10 AR. L. REV. 54, 59-60 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Leflar]; Lindsey,
Arkansas Experience with Comparative Negligence, 10 AMx. L. REv. 70, 71 (1956); Prosser,
supra note 30, at 501-02. See Knoeller, Review of the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence
Act-Suggested Amendment, 41 MARQ. L. REV. 397, 415 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Knoeller].
Use of the general verdict will certainly not serve to facilitate appellate review. Leflar,
supra, at 59-60.
35. Maloney, supra note 9, at 171; Prosser, supra note 30, at 502.
36. Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 547; Pfankuch, Comparative Negligence v. Contributory
Negligence, 1968 INs. L.J. 725, 728 (Feb. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Plankuch].
37. Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 558. This authority, along with the others which will be
cited in relation to Wisconsin's statute, analyzed the provision which allowed the plaintiff
to recover if his negligence was not as great as that of the defendant. This statute was
amended in 1971. Dusenberry, Comparative Negligence: A Time for Change in Alaska, 3
U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA 103, 111 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Dusenberry]. Section 895.045 of the
Wisconsin statutes now allows recovery even if the negligence of the parties is equal.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
39. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 270.27 (Supp. 1973). The statute also provides for a general
verdict with written interrogatories.
40. Dusenberry, supra note 37, at 112; Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 558-66; Heft and
Heft, Comparative Negligence: Wisconsin's Answer, 55 A.B.A.J. 127, 128-29 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Heft]; Knoeller, supra note 34, at 411-14; Maloney, supra note 9, at 171-72;
Pfankuch, supra note 36, at 727-29; Prosser, supra note 30, at 497-503. In both the Ghiardi
and Knoeller articles there are excellent discussions on the form and substance of the Wis-
consin statutory special verdict. The latter article also gives Wisconsin's solutions to incon-
sistent special verdicts.
41. See authorities cited in note 40 supra.
42. FED. R. CIv. P. 49(a); Wright, supra note 30 §§ 2505-10, at 483-520. The discre.
CASES NOTED
Much can be said for the use of the statutory special verdict. It
possesses numerous advantages over the general verdict. First, it would
enable the trial court to know whether the jury has found contributory
negligence and if it has proportionally divided the damages. Second, it
forces the jury to give detailed consideration to specific issues rather than
allowing it simply to find a general conclusion. Third, it avoids the need
for lengthy and complicated instructions. Fourth, the appellate court by
ordering a remittitur could avoid granting a new trial. Finally, if a new
trial is necessary, it could be limited to those issues not correctly found
by the jury, or to which the judge applied the law incorrectly.' 3
Proponents of limiting the role of juries will undoubtedly capitalize
upon the apparent inconsistencies in the Hoffman court's opinion."4 The
major one is the supreme court's statement of its purposes for adopting the
pure form rule. The court prefaced its first purpose of "fault apportion-
ment" with the words to allow a jury, but omitted them in stating its second
purpose of "diminution of damages in proportion to fault. 45 This omis-
sion could be construed as favoring the Wisconsin type of special verdict
procedure in which the jury apportions the percentage of negligence and
fixes the proportionate damages, but leaves to the court the reduction of
damages.'6 However, the effect of this inconsistency is ameliorated when
viewed in conjunction with the court's examples in which it depicts the
jury, and not the judge, fulfilling both of these purposes.' 7 There is also
the Hoffman court's statement in the "counterclaim example" that the
trial court's primary responsibility is to enter a judgment which reflects
the true intent of the jury as expressed in the verdicts.'
A general verdict with written (special) interrogatories would
harmonize these apparent conflicts.49 It represents the middle ground
between the general and special verdicts.50 This verdict form possesses
many of the latter's advantages, 51 and in addition, permits the jury to
apply the law to its fact findings. 2 Its use in the federal courts under
tionary feature of the federal rule is in accord with the special verdict provision in the
Hoffman decision. 280 So. 2d at 439.
43. Prosser, supra note 30, at 502. Dean Prosser points out that special verdicts operate
in the defendant's favor. For examples of comparative negligence special verdicts see 7 Am.
JuR. TRau.s Motorboat Accident Litigation § 83, at 117-20 (1964).
44. 280 So. 2d at 438-39.
45. Id. at 439.
46. Authorities cited note 40 supra.
47. 280 So. 2d at 438-39.
48. Id. at 439.
49. Compare 280 So. 2d at 438-39 with Wright, supra note 30 §§ 2511-13, at 521-33
with Fm. R. Civ. P. 49(b). For a general discussion as to the provisions of these verdicts
see Wright, supra note 30 § 2513, at 526-33.
50. Wright, supra note 30 § 2511, at 521.
51. Authorities cited note 43 supra. The "instruction advantage" is of course not appli-
cable.
52. Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 426, 440 (1966); Wright, supra note 30 § 2511, at 521; Prosser,
supra note 30, at 497-98. General instruction on the applicable legal standards is required
under rule 49(b). Wright, supra note 30 5 2509, at 512.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(b) entails the submission of written
interrogatories with a general verdict form to the jury."3 One of the
advantages of the 49(b) general verdict with written interrogatories over
the 49 (a) special verdict is that the interrogatories need not be submitted
on every material issue. 54 The decision whether or not to use the general
verdict with written interrogatories is solely within the trial court's
discretion.
The purpose of the general verdict with written interrogatories is
much more in accord with the intent of the Hoffman court than are the
other verdict forms.55 However, in view of the Hoffman court's grant of
broad discretionary power to the trial courts, it is reasonable to conclude
that any one of these verdict forms could be utilized.
These "special verdict" problems are only a few of the many left
unsolved by the Hoffman court. Trial judges will have to forge practical
solutions to these problems by utilizing their broad discretionary power."
One source of possible solutions is the case law established in construing
Florida's former pure form comparative negligence railroad statute. The
Hoffman court expressly ruled that much of it would be applicable under
the new rule.5 7  i
It is evident that unfamiliarity with the pure form of comparative
negligence will present a number of problems for both litigants and judges.
For example, as a result of the Hoffman court's abrogation of contribu-
tory negligence as an absolute defense, defendants are confronted with
the threshold problem of what they have to plead in order to establish
the defense of comparative negligence, and to activate the pure form's
53. Wright, supra note 30 § 2512, at 523. For an example of a general verdict with com-
parative negligence interrogatories see L. FRUMER, 3 BENDER'S FEDERAL PRAcTiE FoRms
AmNoT., Form 3166 at 313-15 (1974).
54. Wright, supra note 30 § 2512, at 524.
55. Compare Moore-McCormack Lines Inc. v. Maryland Ship Ceiling Co., 311 F.2d 663,
669 (4th Cir. 1962); Nordbye, Comments on Selected Provisions of the New Minnesota
Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 672, 687 (1952), with 280 So. 2d at 438-39. The rule 49(b) verdict
form has been said to be more satisfactory when a defendant counterclaims. Guinn, The
Jury System and Special Verdicts, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 175, 179 (1970). But see Brown, Fed-
eral Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 338, 339-40 (1967).
56. 280 So. 2d at 440.
57. Id. at 439, referring to ch. 3744, § 1, 2, [1887] Fla. Laws [hereinafter referred to
as the Florida Railroad Statute]. This statute was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of Florida in 1965. The statute while in force (section 768,06 of the Florida Statutes
(1963)) provided that:
No person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to himself
or his property, where the same is done by his consent, or is caused by his own neg-
ligence. If the plaintiff and the agents of the company are both at fault, the former
may recover, but the amount of the recovery shall be such a proportion of the en-
tire damages sustained as the defendants negligence bears to the combined negli-
gence of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
In addition to cases tried under this statute, Florida juries have also applied the prin-
ciples of the pure form of comparative negligence in actions brought under the Florida
Hazardous Occupations Act. FrA. STAT. § 769.03 (1973) ; Peninsular Tel. Co. v. Dority, 128
Fla. 106, 174 So. 446 (1937). However, the Hoffman court did not hold the cases decided
under this statute applicable to the pure form rule. 280 So. 2d at 439.
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formula of comparison, apportionment, and reduction.58 A defendant
should specifically plead the defense of comparative negligence and prove
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff which acts as an affirmative
partial defense. The pure form rule is only activated and the defense of
comparative negligence deemed established when the defendant has met
his burden of proof by showing that the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence.59 Cases construing the Florida Railroad Statute have
held that proof of the plaintiff's contributory negligence would diminish
the plaintiff's recoverable damages, which in effect means that the de-
fendant has established the defense of comparative negligence."'
As noted, the defendant should specifically plead and prove con-
tributory negligence as an affirmative partial defense. Both Mississippi'
and Wisconsin6 2 also adhere to this view by requiring similar pleading
under their respective pure and modified forms of comparative negligence.
This was also the better practice under the Florida Railroad Statute.68
However, even if it was not specifically pleaded, a defendant could still
utilize the defense if evidence of contributory negligence was introduced
by either party. 4
58. See 280 So. 2d at 438; Knoeller, supra note 34, at 408; Shell & Bufkin, Compara-
tive Negligence in Mississippi, 27 Miss. L.J. 105, 118 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Shell];
Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 554.
59. Note, Torts-Effect of Mississippi's Comparative Negligence, 39 Miss. L.J. 493, 503-
04 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Torts].
60. Powell v. Proctor, 143 Fla. 153, 196 So. 419 (1940); Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119,
192 So. 628 (1940); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Gibson, 119 Fla. 112, 161 So. 727 (1935). Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Bracewell, 110 So. 2d 482 (Fla. ist Dist. 1959); Bowe v. Butler, 133 So.
2d 347 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1956).
61. Shell, supra note 76, at 118. This view was also followed by Arkansas defendants in
pleading under that state's 1955 pure form statute. Leflar, Comparative Negligence: A Sur-
vey for Arkansas Lawyers, 10 ARK. L. REV. 54, 57-58 (1956). One serious disadvantage in
this method in Mississippi was the danger that plaintiff's counsel would argue that the de-
fendant's pleading was an admission of liability and an effort to reduce the judgment. This
created the risk that the jury might construe the pleading against the defendant. Torts, su-
pra note 59, at 503.
62. Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 554; Knoeller, supra note 34, at 408.
63. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Britton, 109 Fla. 212, 146 So. 842 (1933); Warfield v.
Hepburn, 62 Fla. 409, 57 So. 618 (1912); Farnsworth v. Tampa Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 166, 57
So. 233 (1912). This view is in accord with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) (pleading of affirma-
tive defenses).
64. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Britton, 109 Fla. 212, 146 So. 842 (1933). Earlier cases
had limited the availability of the defense's use of the contributory negligence defense to
such negligence found in the evidence introduced by the plaintiff. E.g., Warfield v. Hepburn,
62 Fla. 409, 57 So. 618 (1912). This practice remains viable in light of a 1960 decision by
the Florida Supreme Court which held that:
Read together Rule 1.8(d) (1.110(d)] relating to affirmative defenses, Rule
1.11(h) relating to waiver of defenses, and Rule 1.15(b) [1.190(b)] providing for
amendments to conform with evidence, have to do with a large area of procedural or
adjective law and if aftirmative defenses are not proffered but are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated as if they had been raised
by the pleadings. They may be made to conform to the evidence as late as or after
judgment or decree. This is particularly true if essential to justice or if the presenta-
tion of the merits will be effectively expedited. It is part of what we call liberality
of amendments.
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There are also a number of complete defenses which defendants
could plead. These could be pleaded either in the alternative to, or in
lieu of, contributory negligence. Defendants could plead that the plaintiff
was guilty of assumption of risk,65 that the negligence of the plaintiff
was the sole legal cause of his injuries, 6 or that the negligence of the
plaintiff coinciding with that of a person other than the defendant was
the legal cause of the former's injuries.67 If a defendant is able to prove
any of these three complete defenses, the pure form comparative negli-
gence rule would be inapplicable.68
Juries will also be confronted with a number of problems left un-
solved by the Hoffman court. Of these, three are readily discernible. First,
what basis will juries use in their apportionment of the legally causal
negligence of each party? It appears that the court wants the jury to
compare the degree of causation, and not the kind, character, or number
of acts of negligence by each party. 9 It is obvious that this process can
never attain mathematical precision, and no solution was advanced by
the court. 1 Second, how will a jury diminish the plaintiff's damages if
it should find that a certain percentage of the negligence was attributable
to an intervening cause? For example, a jury could find the plaintiff free
of negligence, the defendant 85 percent negligent, and attribute the
remaining 15 percent of negligence to an intervening cause. How should
the jury diminish the plaintiff's damages? Should it diminish the plaintiff's
damages by the 15 percent attributable to the intervening cause or should
it award the plaintiff the entire amount of damages sustained. The first
result would be unfair to a non-negligent plaintiff, but the second result
would be unfair to the defendant whom the jury had found to be only
85 percent negligent. This hypothetical situation poses a very real
problem to juries. Third, how will juries diminish a plaintiff's damages
when it finds that the injuries caused to him by the defendant were the
proximate cause of subsequent injuries to the plaintiff? If the case law
Garret v. Oak Hall Club, 118 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. 1960) (current rule numbers in brackets)
(emphasis added).
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that it is within the discretion of the jury
to mitigate the damages even when contributory negligence is not pleaded and no instruc-
tion is given concerning it. Torts, supra note 59, at 503-04.
65. 280 So. 2d at 439.
66. Id. at 438.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 438-39. It is to be noted that a plaintiff still has the burden of pleading and
proving that the defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages in a pure
form comparative negligence jurisdiction. For example, failure by a Mississippi plaintiff
to prove causation entitled the defendant to a directed verdict. Shell, supra note 58, at 111.
This also appears to have been the view under the Florida Railroad Statute. Florida E.C.
Ry. v. Davis, 96 Fla. 171, 117 So. 842 (1928); Smith, Richardson & Conroy v. Tampa
Elec. Co., 82 Fla. 79, 89 So. 2d 352 (1921).
69. See Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 559; Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence-
Problems of Theory and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MaRQ. L. Rav. 293, 294-97 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Aiken].
70. Knoeller, supra note 34, at 400; Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463, 492 (1970).
71. 280 So. 2d at 438-40.
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construing the former comparative negligence railroad statute prevails,
the jury should diminish the plaintiff's damages in proportion to the
plaintiff's fault in causing the added injury.72
Another problem which will be of immediate concern is that of jury
instructions.73 Florida's civil standard jury instructions will require four
amendments to insure their conformity with the Hoffman court's deci-
sion.7 The Florida Railroad Statute cases will also be helpful in solving
this problem.73
In addition to this case law, the instructions utilized under the
respective pure form statutes in the Arkansas, 0 Mississippi,"' and federal
courts should be invaluable in the formulation of Florida's comparative
negligence jury instructions.78
72. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Wallace, 61 Fla. 93, 54 So. 893 (1911).
73. 280 So. 2d at 439.
74. Fla. Standard Jury Instructions Civil, 3.8, 4.3 (contributory negligence only diminish-
ing, not barring plaintiff's recovery), 6.1(b) (apportionment of damages). A general com-
parative negligence instruction must be added. 280 So. 2d at 439.
75. These cases indicate that it was reversible error for a trial judge to refuse to instruct
the jury that the portion of either party's negligence which did not proximately cause any
damage should be disregarded in apportioning the plaintiff's and defendant's negligence,
Florida Cent. & P.R.R. v. Williams, 37 Fla. 406, 20 So. 588 (1896); that it is the duty of
every person to exercise due care commensurate with the danger to be apprehended, Florida
Ry. v. Geiger, 64 Fla. 282, 60 So. 753 (1913); how to measure the recovery under com-
parative negligence, Brickley v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 13 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1943); that
the jury must believe that the defendant's negligence was the legal cause of the plaintiff's
loss, Florida E.C. Ry. v. Smith, 61 Fla. 218, 55 So. 871 (1911); and if the jury believes
that the plaintiff's loss was caused by his own negligence, it must find for the defendant,
as to the proper measure of recovery under comparative negligence. Id.
Similarly, it was held not to be reversible error for a trial court to instruct the jury
that a plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and that it should determine if
the defendant was guilty of legally causal negligence, Kirkpatrick v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 259 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1958), and that the negligence of the parents of an injured
child should be disregarded, Tampa Elec. Co. v. Bazemore, 85 Fla. 164, 96 So. 297 (1923).
It was also held to be proper for the court to charge the jury on contributory negligence
when evidence had been presented which could warrant a jury finding that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Bracewell, 110 So. 2d 482 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1959); to refuse to give the charge that the plaintiff could not recover if his
negligence was the sole legal cause of his injuries where there had been no evidence pre-
sented to that effect, Director Gen. of. Railroads v. Into, 83 Fla. 377, 91 So. 269 (1922);
and to refuse to give the jury an example of the pure form rule's practical application in
reinstructing the jury where several inquiring jurors indicated that the court's further
charge made the question clear, Bush v. Louisville & N.R.R., 260 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1958).
76. Panel on Instructions and Special Verdicts Under Comparative Negligence, 10 ARx.
L. REv. 94, 100-113 (1956). Arkansas adopted a pure form type statute in 1955. Ark. Acts
1955, no. 191 § 1. Two years later the statute was amended to allow recovery only when
the plaintiff's negligence was of a lesser degree than any defendant's. ARK. STAT. ANN.,
§§ 27-1730.1 & .2 (1962) (originally enacted in 1957).
77. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1956) (originally enacted in 1910). It should be remembered
that in Mississippi only the general verdict is utilized. Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 547.
78. There are pure form comparative negligence provisions in the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
I 688 (1970), the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1970), and the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970). For an excellent example of pure form
instructions see 7 Am. JuR. TRIALs Motor Boat Accident Litigation § 82, at 114 (1972).
For additional examples of pure form comparative negligence jury instructions see 18
AM. JuR. PLEADING AND PRACTICE Foass Negligence Forms 292 (degree of plaintiff's negli-
gence exceeding defendant's negligence no bar to plaintiff's recovery), 293 (multiple defen-
dants-negligence of defendants treated as unit), 294 at 530 (rev. ed. 1972) (multiple de-
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In addition, the Hoffman court left the problem of appellate review
to subsequent judicial pronouncement. The question of whether an appel-
late court will delve into the jury's fault apportionment and damage
diminution remains to be answered although under the Florida Railroad
Statute this was held to be a proper subject of appellate review.79 How-
ever, these cases also indicate that the verdict should not be disturbed
if reasonable men could have reached the same conclusion,8" or if the
verdict is not patently unreasonable."1
Countless more problems will undoubtedly arise as judges, juries
and attorneys attempt to apply the pure form rule in the courtroom.
Problems such as whether to allow contribution among joint tortfeasors, 2
and the effect this rule will have upon negligence doctrines such as
res ipsa loquitur8 3 and negligence per se14 are yet to be resolved. But,
regardless of its complexity or magnitude, no problem can overshadow
this rule's fundamental fairness and justice in equitably distributing the
burden of accidental loss.8 5
JOHN B. CULVERHOUSE
fendants-individual negligence of each defendant as basis of comparison); 17 AM. JUR.
PLEA INO AND PaAcncE FoRms Master and Servant Forms 283-84, at 542-43 (rev. ed. 1971)
(contributory negligence as basis for reducing damages); 21 Am. JuR. PLEADING AND PRAC-
TIcE Fopms Railroads Form 126, at 108-09 (rev. ed. 1972) (measure of damages); 3 Am.
JUR. PLEADING AND PRACnTCE FoRms Automobiles and Highway Traffic Form 1467 (appor-
tioning percentage of negligence).
79. Florida E.C. Ry. v. Meachan, 77 Fla. 701, 82 So. 232 (1919); Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Hobbs, 71 Fla. 109, 70 So. 939 (1916); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Teuton, 110
So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959). If an appellate court found the jury's apportionment of
damages to be incorrect in proportion to the comparative fault of the parties, a new trial
was granted unless the prevailing party complied with the court's remittitur order requiring
damage reduction. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Watkins, 97 Fla. 350, 121 So. 95 (1929).
80. Triay v. Seals, 92 Fla. 310, 109 So. 427 (1926).
81. Florida E.C. Ry. v. Frederitzi, 77 Fla. 150, 81 So. 104 (1919).
82. Fisher, supra note 21, at 571-72. Wisconsin, which follows the modified form of
comparative negligence, permits contribution among joint tortfeasors. However, the liability
of each is determined in accord with the principles of the pure form. Aiken, supra note 69,
at 299; Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 552; Heft, supra note 40, at 129-30; Pfankuch, supra
note 36, at 729. For other articles containing discussions regarding the effect of contribu-
tion between joint tortfeasors and multiple parties vis-a-vis comparative negligence, see
Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 794 (1972). Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 722 (1966); Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1
(1965); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1101 (1954); Heft, Comparative Negligence-Problem Child: A
Study of Growth to Manhood, 7 DEF. L.J. 46 (1960); Gregory, Loss Distribution by Com-
parative Negligence, 21 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1960); Leflar, Walker, & Bethell, Panel on Com-
parative Negligence Third Party Practice, 10 ARK. L. REV. 88 (1956) ; Prosser, supra note 30.
83. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that its modified form comparative negligence
rule abrogates the requirement that the plaintiff's injury must not have been due to any
of his own voluntary or contributory acts. Ghiardi, supra note 25, at 555.
84. Fisher, supra note 21, at 569. For the effect that Mississippi's pure form statute has
had on such doctrines, see Torts-Effect of Mississippi's Comparative Negligence Statute
on Other Rules of Law, 39 Miss. L.J. 493 (1968).
85. 280 So. 2d at 436. It will also be interesting to see what effect the pure form rule
will have on the increase or reduction in pre-trial settlements. A survey of Arkansas' two
year experience with its pure form statute, conducted in 1959, found that the number
increased. Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey,
13 AiK. L. REV. 89 (1959).
